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Discovery of Government Attorney
Work Product under the FOIA
INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)' was enacted in
1966 to promote good government by increasing agency accoun-
tability to citizens, legislators and the press.2 The Act was in-
tended to bring government activities into the "sunshine." 3
However, the Act also has been recognized as a valuable supple-
ment to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP).4 In fact, the primary users of FOIA procedures have
been attorneys seeking not to oversee government activities, but
rather to press private claims.s This use has raised numerous
questions about the scope of the FOIA exemptions from disclosure
and the mesh between the exemptions and the discovery privileges
under the FRCP.
The FOIA mandates disclosure of government documents6
subject only to seven specified exemptions. 7 One of these exemp-
tions, Exemption 5,8 incorporates into the FOIA the privileges
normally available to a party engaged in civil litigation, including
the attorney work product privilege.9 Application of the
15 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2 See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Aar SOURCEBOOK, S. Doe. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (reprints legislative history,
case summaries and law review articles) [hereinafter cited as FOIA SOURCEBOOK].
3 See generally J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE §§ 2, 4 (1978).
4 See Levine, Using the Freedom of Information Act as a Discovery Device, 36 Bus.
LAW. 45, 55 (1980-81); Fleming, The Freedom of Information Act: An Important
Discovery Aid in Labor Law Cases, 53 FLA. B.J. 603 (1979). For a view that the benefits
of the Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter cited as FOIA] as a discovery device may
be overstated, see Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 843, 854-59
(1980-81). However, it should be noted that a primary advantage of FOIA disclosure is
that it is available before the commencement of a civil action.
5 The courts have not always approved this use. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Banner-
craft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 22 (1973).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
7 Id. § 552(b).
8 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)(5) provides: "This section does not apply to matters that
are ... inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."
9 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975). Work product can be
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discovery rules in the FOIA context .is not without difficulty,
however.Il Lower courts have often reached conflicting results,"
and the United States Supreme Court has said the rules are ap-
plicable in this situation only by "rough analogies."' 2
The latest visitor to this "rather unexplored corner of FOIA
law"'13 is the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. In Grolier, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC),14 the court was confronted with a FOIA request from
Grolier for production of documents concerning a closed FTC case
against Grolier's subsidiary, Americana Corporation.15 The agen-
cy claimed that the materials were exempt from disclosure as at-
torney work product. Rather than seizing the opportunity to
establish an analytical standard for determining what is protected
work product in the FOIA context, the court, against the weight
of modern authority, 16 held that the documents could not be pro-
tected because the work product privilege, even if applicable, ter-
defined as documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative. See FED. B. CIV.
P. 26(b)(3) [hereinafter cited as FRCP]; C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2024 (1970).
10 One court has called the application of the attorney work product privilege in
the FOIA context a "task that would challenge the fabled Procrustes." Fonda v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 434 F. Supp. 498, 505 (D.D.C. 1977). According to legend, Procrustes,
a bandit who terrorized ancient Greece, forced his victims to fit a certain bed by either
stretching their legs or cutting them off.
11 Compare Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-98
(D.D.C. 1978), afJ'd, 663 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (factual material must be segregated
and disclosed) with St. Louis Post-Dispatch v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 447 F.
Supp. 31, 37-38 (D.D.C. 1977) (where facts and opinions are "inextricably intertwined,"
disclosure will not be ordered) and Wu v. Kenney, 384 F. Supp. 1161, 1166 (D.D.C. 1974),
aff'd, 527 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (even facts such as names and addresses may be
protected).
12 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
13 Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 623 (5th Cir.), cert. danied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976).
14 671 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1982) (No. 82-372).
15 781 F.2d at 554.
16 See note 4 infra and accompanying text. See also Comment, Civil Procedure-Dis-
covery-Work Product Privilege Extends to Subsequent, Unrelated Litigation, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 826 (1974) (work product privilege is perpetual). See generally Note, Discovery
of an Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DUKE L.J. 799 (general
overview of approaches to use of work product privilege in subsequent litigation).
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minates once the case, and the potential for related litigation,
ends.17
This Comment first examines the circuit court's assertion in
Grolier that work product protection is terminable. Upon con-
cluding that such protection should be perpetual, this Comment
addresses the issue left open by the court of appeals: the appropriate
standard for work product protection in the FOIA context.
I. GROLIER, INC. V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
In 1972, the United States Department of Justice filed a civil
penalty action against Americana Corporation, a subsidiary of
Grolier, Inc.18 The suit alleged violations of an outstanding FTC
cease and desist order relating to false advertising and misrepresen-
tation in the door-to-door sales of encyclopedias. 19 The trial
judge dismissed the action, with prejudice, on November 17, 1976,
after the FTC disobeyed a court order to allow discovery of
documents relating to a 1972 covert investigation of Ameri-
cana.10
During this time, the FTC also was investigating the sales prac-
tices of Grolier (the parent company) and its other subsidiaries
engaged in the sales of encyclopedias and other books and educa-
tional materials. This investigation resulted in a final cease and
desist order issued by the Commission on March 13, 1978.21
17 671 F.2d at 556. The relatedness test suggested by the court seems difficult and
uncertain in application, relying as it does on an assessment of hypothetical litigation and,
perhaps, a crystal ball. See 671 F.2d at 559 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); 421 U.S. at 129
n.16 (it is "not sensible" to construe FOIA to require consideration of hypothetical litiga-
tion in determining whether Exemption 5 applies).
18 United States v. Americana Corp., No. 388-72 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 29, 1972), cited
in 671 F.2d at 544.
19 See Americana Corp., 45 F.T.C. 32 (1948), modified, 46 F.T.C. 253 (1949). The
FTC found that the following misleading claims (among others) were unfair and decep-
tive under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1976): claims that Americana was the "unanimous choice"
of every government department, board of education and public library; claims that the
publication was new, when it was simply a reprint; and claims that the solicitors were
not salesmen, but interviewers authorized to make limited special offers to selected pro-
minent persons. 45 F.T.C. at 41-46. The FTC imposed civil penalties of $16,000 in 1960
and $100,000 in 1965 for violations of the order. See 3 TRADE REC. REP. (CCH) FTC Dkt.
5085.
20 671 F.2d at 554.
21 Grolier, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 315 (1978). The order required Grolier to cease
misrepresentations, to make relevant disclosures, and to stop using unfair or deceptive
methods in the sale of merchandise or services, the recruitment of sales personnel or the
collection of delinquent accounts. Id.
1982,-83]
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Later in 1978, Grolier initiated a request under the FOIA for
production of the documents relating to the FTC's investigation
of the Americana matter. 2 The Commission released numerous
documents23 but withheld certain items, claiming that they con-
stituted attorney work product and were therefore exempt under
5 U.S.C. section 552(b)(5) (Exemption 5).24 Grolier then initiated
a FOIA action in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia seeking an order for the production of the documents.
The district court denied the order and ruled in favor of the
Commission.25
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit vacated that part of the district court's judg-
ment which denied the request for the production of documents
on the grounds of work product privilege.23 The court of appeals
agreed with the FTC that the disputed documents were attorney
work product. However, the court focused on whether the pro-
tection against disclosure of documents deemed to be work pro-
duct continues several years after termination of the suit which
prompted the preparation of the documents.27 The court's
analysis of the temporal scope of work product privilege began
with the observation that a "'dispute [exists] among the courts as
to whether.., the protection afforded by the [work product]
privilege lapses once the litigation has ended or the prospects for
litigation have faded.' ,2 After noting that opinions expressed in
prior decisions ranged from the view that protection must be
2 Grolier, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 63, 188
(D.D.C.). Actually, Grolier first sought the documents through discovery in the FTC ad-
ministrative proceedings. However, the documents were not discoverable under the FTC
Rules of Practice, and Grolier appealed to the D.C. District Court, where it argued that
the FOIA commanded production of the documents. The court ruled that Grolier would
have to file a request pursuant to the FOIA before it would consider a contention that
the FTC had violated the Act. Grolier, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, X F.T.C. Ct. Dees.
325 (D.D.C. 1976). Grolier filed its request, pursuant to FOIA, on June 20, 1978. 1980-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,188 at 77,915.
23 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,188 at 77,915 n.2.
24 Id. See note 8 supra for the statutory language of Exemption 5.
2 Grolier, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,389
(D.D.C.).
2 671 F.2d at 557. The court of appeals remanded to the district court for considera-
tion of the existence of related litigation. Id.
27 Id. at 554.
2 Id. at 555 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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perpetual to be effective to the view that no protection exists
beyond the immediate litigation, 29 the court determined that
"[tlhe purpose of the privilege ... 'is to encourage effective legal
representation within the framework of the adversary system by
removing counsel's fears that his thoughts and information will
be invaded by his adversary. In other words, the privilege focuses
on the integrity of the adversary trial process itself .... "30 In
the view of the court of appeals, the work product privilege exists
only to protect the adversaries from discovery by their immediate
opponents. The court concluded that there is no need to extend
the privilege beyond the termination of the immediate litiga-
tion.31 Finally, the court noted that the policy of disclosure in-
herent in FOIA was consistent with its ruling which denied the
Commission the benefit of work product protection.
32
II. TEMPORAL SCOPE OF THE WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE
Neither the opinion rendered in Hickman v. Taylor,3 where
the United States Supreme Court attempted to clearly articulate
the work product doctrine,3 nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3),- which effectively codified that doctrine,B addresses
the question of whether work product is protected in subsequent
litigation. Any analysis of the issue must begin with an examina-
tion of the policies articulated in Hickman, and whether they con-
tinue to be relevant once the first litigation has ceased.
Although Hickman attempted to resolve the uncertainty con-
cerning the work product doctrine, the decision raised as many
questions as it answered. 37 Commentators have complained that
the opinion's language is loose and vague,8 and that the policies
29 671 F.2d at 555.
30 Id. at 556 (quoting Jordan v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 591 F.2d 753, 775 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
31 Id.
32 Id.
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3 See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MiLLER. supra note 9, at § 2020.
FRCP 26(b)(3).
36 C. WRIcHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9 at § 2023 & n.14.
37 See Viront v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 10 F.R.D. 45, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1950)
(Hickman opened "Pandora's Box"); see generally C. WmcIrr & A. MILLER, supra note
9, at § 2022 (decisions went in many directions).
3 See, e.g., Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1269, 1272
1982-83]
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upon which the decision is based are ill-defined. 39 Nevertheless,
the basis of Hickman is that the efficacy of the adversary system
depends on the ability of the lawyer to "assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts,
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and
needless interference." 40 This notion reflects the recognition that
the adversary system is, at least to a degree, a competitive pro-
cess, which depends for its accuracy on the clash of opposing view-
points, with the attorneys marshalling their best arguments to ad-
vance their clients' interests. 41 In addition to this basic policy, the
Supreme Court in Hickman expressed concern that failure to pro-
tect work product would produce "inefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices" 42 with a "demoralizing" effect on the legal pro-
fession.4
3
The court of appeals in Grolier indicated that these policies
are relevant only between the adversaries of a pending lawsuit."
Yet it is the prospect of future disclosure of thoughts and legal
theories, whether utilized or discarded, that may hinder an at-
torney's preparation of the case at hand. Although Hickman's
policies are certainly strongest with respect to the immediate par-
ties, it is not likely that they will totally dissipate upon the con-
clusion of the suit. Rather, the likelihood that an attorney's private
files would be made public at some future time would probably
affect his preparation of a case and maintenance of files. The Court
in Hickman sought to prevent the loss of the sound attorney prac-
tice of notetaking as an essential element of trial preparation;
45
a loss that would be to the detriment of the client and the cause
of justice. In addition, such a rule might tempt attorneys to main-
tain private, "safe" files beyond the reach of discovery, the sort
of "sharp practice" the Supreme Court attempted to discourage
with the Hickman decision. 46 One court has stated: "[t]he
(1968-69).
39 Id. at 1273.
40 329 U.S. at 511.
41 Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedures, 64 VA. L. REy. 333, 334 (1978).
42 329 U.S. at 511.
43 Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
44 671 F.2d at 556.
45 329 U.S. at 511.
46 See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
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mischief engendered by allowing discovery of work product
recognized in Hickman would apply with equal vigor to discovery
in future, unrelated litigation."' 4 Therefore, in order to be effec-
tive, the work product protection must be perpetual.
The holding of the court in Grolier fails to effectuate the
policies of Hickman; in addition, it is contrary to the weight of
modem authority. Although the Grolier decision is consistent with
several district court decisions, 48 the three federal courts of ap-
peals that have considered the issue have found that the work pro-
duct protection must be perpetual. 49 Further, the United States
Supreme Court has ignored a past opportunity to adopt Grolier's
limitation on work product.5 It appears that the holding of
Grolier is incorrect; the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,51
and should rectify the error.
47 In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 335 (8th Cir. 1977). The case in which discovery
was sought was a civil action brought by the Justice Department against three phar-
maceutical firms for alleged fraudulent and illegal patent and marketing activities. Id.
at 329-30. The case provides an interesting contrast to Grolier. In Murphy it is the govern-
ment seeking discovery of work product material and asserting that the privilege is inap-
plicable in a subsequent lawsuit. For a discussion of Murphy, see Comment, The Poten-
tial for Discovery of Opinion Work Product under Rule 26(b)(3), 64 IowA L. REV. 103
(1978).
48 See, e.g., United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970);
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
49 In re Murphy, 560 F.2d at 326; United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d
655 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975);
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973).
'0 In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 132, plaintiff sought disclosure
of certain memoranda prepared by the NLRB Office of General Counsel over a period
of five years. The memoranda consisted of attorney recommendations to pursue litigation
concerning unfair labor practices or to close particular matters. Recommendations to close
were held "final opinions" under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2)(A) and so disciosable. Id. at 158.
Memoranda prepared in contemplation of future litigation was held exempt from disclosure
as attorney work product; it should be noted that the Court did not consider whether the
matter had been subsequently closed or whether related litigation existed. Id. at 159-60.
Thus, the Supreme Court ignored an opportunity to adopt the position that work product
protection terminates with the conclusion of the case.
51 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Grolier, Inc., 671 F.2d at 553, cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. at 3362 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1982) (No. 82-372).
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III. PROPER ANALYSIS OF WORK PRODUCT
IN THE FOIA CONTEXT
Because the court in Grolier decided, seemingly incorrectly, 52
that the work product privilege ends with the conclusion of prior
litigation, and, consequently, that the disputed documents were
not privileged in the FOIA context,53 it was not necessary to con-
sider the appropriate analysis of the work product privilege in the
FOIA context. Assuming, however, that the United States Supreme
Court rules that the protection of work product does extend beyond
the end of litigation, it will be necessary to determine what
documents constitute protected work product within the FOIA
context.
Exemption 5 exempts from the disclosure requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act "inter-agency or intra-agency memo-
randums or letters which would not be available by law to a par-
ty other than an agency in litigation with the agency."' 54 Al-
though the statutory language is somewhat cryptic, the legislative
history and subsequent cases make clear that three major classes
of privileges were intended: 1) the deliberative privilege;-5 2) the
attorney-client privilege; 4 and 3) the attorney work product
privilege.5 In each case, the source of the privilege must be
determined, because the Exemption 5 protection is not coexten-
sive for each class.
Exemption 5 is invoked most often to protect documents which
reflect the "deliberative process" of the agency and its employees.
These materials, prepared in the course of the agency's decision-
52 See notes 33-51 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of why this deci-
sion was incorrect.
53 671 F.2d at 556.
-4 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
5 The deliberative privilege permits an agency to use discretion in withholding writ-
ten materials which represent advisory, recommendatory or draft policy memoranda
developed in the predecisional policy-making function. Such materials are protected to
preserve the confidentiality of the often sensitive decision-making process. Of course, all
final decisions must be disclosed; it is only subjective predecisional material that may be
withheld. J. O'REILLY, supra note 3, at § 15.07. See also S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9, reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 36, 44; H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 22, 31; NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151-53.
56 421 U.S. at 149; J. O'REILLY, supra note 3, at § 15.11.
57 421 U.S. at 149; J. O'REILLY, supra note 3, at § 15.11.
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making process, are protected in order to encourage "frank discus-
sion of legal and policy matters" and to avoid forcing the agency
to "operate in a fishbowl."s8 The Supreme Court held in Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.59 that this
protection extends only to "predecisional" materials, 6 thus
balancing the need to protect the decision-making process with
the need to avoid "secret law."61 Most material exempted under
this privilege is advisory or subjective in nature. Generally, fac-
tual matter is not protected,62 unless the facts are "inextricably
intertwined" with protected material,63 or unless the document
is a summary of facts available elsewhere, prepared solely for
analytical purposes.64
In addition to the protection for materials related to the
deliberative process, Exemption 5 is intended to protect certain
materials privileged in civil litigation, primarily attorney-client
communications" and attorney work product. 6 The key test
stated in the legislative history is whether the documents would
"routinely be disclosed"67' in civil discovery. Thus, the protections
available under Rule 26(b)(3) 68 are incorporated under Exemp-
tion 5. 69
However, there is an important distinction between the ap-
plication of Rule 26(b)(3) in civil discovery and in FOIA litiga-
tion via Exemption 5. Rule 26(b) (3) provides that a private litigant
M S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 2, at 44.
59 421 U.S. at 132.
60 Id. at 151-52.
61 "Secret law" is a phrase coined by Professor Davis to describe agency use of
precedents, policies and guidelines prior to publication or availability to the public. Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cni. L. REv. 761, 797 (1967);
reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 240, 276. The term has gained wide
judicial acceptance. See, e.g., 421 U.S. at 153.
62 410 U.S. at 87-88.
63 Mervin v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 591 F.2d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Soucie
v. Davis, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
64 Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
65 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 149. ,
6 Id. One court has extended Exemption 5 protection to expert work product, nor-
mally accorded a limited protection under FRCP 26(b)(4). Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irv-
ing, 548 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (4th cir. 1977).
67 421 U.S. at 149 n.16 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
68 FRCP 26(b)(3).
69 421 U.S. at 149.
1982-83]
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may override a claim of work product privilege by a showing of
"substantial need" and "undue hardship."70 In contrast, the
FOIA provides no mechanism for considering the needs of the par-
ticular litigant;7' rather, it provides an objective standard. Thus,
under FOIA, documents are protected which are "normally
privileged" in the civil discovery context72 without regard to
whether the particular litigant can make a showing of substan-
tial need.
The federal rules contain two classes of attorney work pro-
duct. The "core" of work product, consisting of the "mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories"' 3 of an attor-
ney, is the primary focus of the doctrine. Opinion work product
is seldom,74 if ever, 75 discoverable under the federal rules. Con-
sequently, it should never be discoverable under FOIA.76 This is
the class of material at issue in Grolier;77 thus, the court should
have protected the documents as not subject to discovery in civil
litigation.
A more difficult question is the extent to which factual material
constituting work product may be entitled to protection under
Exemption 5. Generally, factual material falling into the
"deliberative process" class must be segregated and disclosed. 78
70 FRCP 26(b)(3).
71 See 421 U.S. at 149 n.16; Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 450 F.2d
698, 704 n.4 (1971); Davis, supra note 61, at 795. Note that in some cases factual material
important to a particular party may not be available under the FOIA. Nevertheless, such
material may be available under the Federal Rules by a showing of "substantial need."
The fact that a FOIA exemption may apply does not imply that the information is pro-
tected in civil discovery. See Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Froehlke, 81 F.R.D. 609, 612-13 (M.D.
Fla. 1979); Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Information
Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 CEO. WASH. L. REy. 843, 848-54 (1980-81).
72 421 U.S. at 149.
73 FRCP 26(b)(3). See Cooper, supra note 38, at 1283-1301 (hard core of mental im-
pressions, subjective evaluations should be protected).
74 329 U.S. at 512-13; see also Note, supra note 41, at 341 (rare exceptions may exist).
75 Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d at 736 (men-
tal impressions are "immune" from discovery).
76 See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 154. However, if a document
falls into the affirmative disclosure provision of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) as a "final opin-
ion," it must be disclosed. 421 U.S. at 158-59. See also Niemeier v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1977) (attorney predecisional memorandum
incorporated by reference in a final report becomes a "final opinion" for the purposes of
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A)).
77 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,389 (D.D.C.).
78 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88.
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Similarly, some courts have held that factual material may never
be withheld under Exemption 5, even where the claim is privilege
for work product7 9 Yet, factual material which has been
developed by an attorney in anticipation of litigation has sometimes
been held protected in civil discovery.8 Hickman itself con-
cerned a dispute over the discovery of witness statements. 8'
There are two factors at work here. First, the need to protect fac-
tual material, while relevant, is less compelling than the need to
protect subjective work product. Courts might allow disclosure
on the theory that it is required by the policy of liberal discovery.
Second, in the FOIA context, courts are reluctant to protect
factual work product for fear that the result would swallow the
Mink rule that factual material is not protected under the
deliberative privilege. 2 The District of Columbia Circuit has ex-
pressed the concern that documents, otherwise disclosable, could
escape production simply by being cast as attorney work pro-
duct . 3
What is needed is an analysis that recognizes both the agen-
cy's legitimate interest in the protection of work product and the
need for a limitation on the agency's discretion in withholding pro-
perly disclosable material. In order to balance these competing
interests, the courts should analyze factual work product to deter-
mine whether disclosure would tend to reveal "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories of... [the] attorney...
concerning the litigation."84 This shifts the focus from the simple
79 See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d at 1137-38; Fonda v. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, 434 F. Supp. at 505.
80 E.g., Bercrow v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 39 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Vin-
ta Oil Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495, 505-06 (D. Utah 1964); Mac-
Millan v. General Motors Corp., 179 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
81 See 329 U.S. at 500.
82 548 F.2d 1131.
83 See Mervin v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 591 F.2d at 825; Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 424 F.2d 935,939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970)
("Purely factual reports and scientific studies cannot be cloaked in secrecy by an exemp-
tion designed to protect only 'those internal working papers in which opinions are expressed
and policies formulated and recommended."' (footnote omitted)).
84 FRCP 26(b)(3). See 591 F.2d at 826; Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d
at 1137-38; Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d at 624. For an interesting discussion of the
application of 'a similar analysis to the discovery of compilations prepared in anticipation
of litigation, see Note, Work Product Protection for Compilations of Nonparty Documents:
A Proposed Analysis, 66 VA. L. REv. 1323 (1980).
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inquiry of whether the material was prepared "in anticipation of
litigation," yet provides protection sufficient to meet the policies
of Hickman.
Under this analysis, material which is purely factual would
in most cases be discoverable, yet without harming an attorney's
ability to conduct his or her case. Items such as an evidence sum-
mary reflecting counsel's analysis of the relevant facts would not
be disclosable. 5 Legal memoranda in which law and fact are in-
tertwined also would be protected.86 This analysis effectively
protects sensitive subjective material, while furthering the FOIA's
objective of maximum public disclosure consistent with the effi-
cient operation of government.
8 7
CONCLUSION
The Grolier decisionss is important, if it stands, because of its
far reaching implications. First, it has the effect of establishing
a different rule for the discovery of government attorney work
product than for private attorney work product. Discovery of
the latter is limited by the relevance requirement of FRCP
26(b)(1);89 it may be difficult to meet this requirement in
"unrelated litigation."9 Of course, since the FOIA creates a right
to the production of documents without regard to the existence
of pending litigation, there can be no relevance requirement in
the FOIA context. Therefore, under the FOIA and the rationale
of the Grolier decision, government attorney work product, in-
cluding the "core" of mental impressions, opinions and legal
theories, always will be obtainable once the litigation terminates.
It seems likely that this prospect could have a chilling effect on
the case preparation and file maintenance practices of government
attorneys.
Second, the decision has the paradoxical result of making
governmental deliberations relating to litigation more easily ob-
8 See 591 F.2d at 826.
86 See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d at 1077-78.
87 See generally FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 38.
8 See notes 18-32 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Grolier
decision.
89 FRCP 26(b)(1); C. WmcRHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, at § 2008-10.
90 Grolier Corp. v. FTC, 671 F.2d at 556.
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tainable than predecisional deliberations which do not relate to
litigation. This result is undesirable because no principled distinc-
tion can be made based upon the nature of the material that would
warrant such different treatment.
Finally, the Grolier decision has a broad impact because of
the FOIA provision which permits any FOIA action to be brought
in the district court of the District of Columbia. 9' Thus, the deci-
sion of the District of Columbia Circuit effectively preempts the
contrary rule prevailing in three other circuits, which accords
perpetual work product protection.92
The court of appeals in Grolier, in holding that the work pro-
duct privilege is not perpetual, failed to apply properly the prin-
ciples underlying the work product doctrine. The United States
Supreme Court has granted certiorari. The Court should correct
this error and hold that the work product protection is perpetual.
The Court also should articulate an analytical standard for the
resolution of work product problems in the FOIA area.
Richard Allen Vance
Subsequent to the preparation of this Comment for publication, the United
States Supreme Court considered the application of the work product privilege
in the context of FOIA litigation in Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier Inc.,
51 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 7, 1983), rev'g 671 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court rejected the "related litigation" test applied by the court
of appeals, and stated that the test under Exemption 5 was "whether the
documents would 'routinely' or 'normally' be disclosed." Id. at 4662. The Court
held, consistent with the views of this Comment, that "work-product is exempt
from mandatory disclosure without regard to the status of the litigation for which
it was prepared." Id. at 4662.
91 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
92 See note 49 supra.
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